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How well do wage and price controls work against 
inflation? Past studies of the last U.S. experiment with 
such controls used deficient methods and don't agree 
on the answer to this question. To reexamine the 
impact of the last controls, we have used a new tech-
nique which overcomes the worst defects of these 
studies. Our results: 
• Controls held down inflation temporarily, but 
they also held down production. 
• Once controls ended, both prices and production 
rapidly moved to catch up; they rose faster than 
they would have had controls never been im-
posed—and prices ended up higher than they 
otherwise would have. 
These wage and price controls obviously didn't work 
very well. 
Before we look at our method and results in de-
tail, let's briefly review the last controls program and 
examine the methods, results, and deficiencies of pre-
vious studies. 
The Last U.S. Wage and Price Controls 
Without public debate or warning, the Nixon Admin-
istration imposed a wage and price control program 
on August 15, 1971. While the program evolved 
through four phases that ended April 30, 1974, only 
the first two phases were really effective. During the 
ninety days of Phase I (August 15 through November 
13,1971), wages, prices, and rents were frozen. Phase 
II (which lasted until January 11, 1973) was less se-
vere but required that wage and price increases stay 
within strict guidelines overseen by the Cost of Living 
Council and administered by the Pay Board and the 
Price Commission. Large firms had to get approval 
before any increases in wages and prices, and smaller 
firms had to report any increases exceeding the 
guidelines. 
Controls were generally relaxed in the last phases 
of the program. Wages and prices were self-regulated 
during Phase III, and this caused many to believe 
controls had ended.
1 The resulting explosion of 
prices during its first months, however, led to a Presi-
dential refreeze on June 13, 1973, in preparation for 
the August 12 imposition of Phase IV. Though nomi-
nally stronger than Phases I and II, both the refreeze 
and Phase IV were actually weaker because of pro-
gressive deregulation, pressure from unregulated 
prices of imports, and the catch-up which had started 
as Phase II ended. Therefore, though controls did not 
officially end until April 1974, their bite dissipated 
rapidly after Phase II.
2 
Past Studies of the Impact of Controls 
The standard way to investigate the impact of Phases 
I and II is to statistically simulate what would have 
happened had the controls not been imposed and 
compare that "counterfactual benchmark" to what 
actually happened; the difference is assumed to be 
due to controls. To generate the benchmark, studies 
so far have primarily used two methods, both of 
which are flawed. 
'U.S., President, Economic Report of the President (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 103. 
2For a more complete description of the control program, see U.S., 
President, Economic Reports of the President (Washington, D.C.: Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1973 and 1975), p. 51 and p. 219; Daniel J. B. 
Mitchell, "Phase II Wage Controls," Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, Vol. 27, No. 3 (April 1974), p. 351; Walter Guzzardi, Jr., "What 
We Should Have Learned About Controls," Fortune, Vol. 91, No. 3 
(March 1975), p. 102; and Arnold R. Weber, "The 1971 Wage-Price 
Freeze and Incomes Policy," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 95, No. 4 
(April 1972), p. 18. 
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tem of "structural" equations which are intended to 
describe the behavior of agents in the "wage-price 
sector" of the economy.
3 This structural method is 
essentially an attempt to identify the Phillips curve,
4 
and its equations typically express current rates of 
wage and price inflation in terms of current and past 
values of variables such as GNP, the government defi-
cit, the unemployment rate, and the rate of growth of 
productivity. Once the form of each equation has 
been determined,
5 the unknown coefficients in the 
relationships between variables are estimated by an 
appropriate statistical technique using data up to the 
imposition of controls. Then the equations are used 
to generate the sequence of values for each variable 
during and after the control period which presumably 
this sector of the economy would have generated had 
controls never been imposed. 
The other way to generate a counterfactual 
benchmark doesn't rely on descriptions of economic 
behavior; instead, it relies on purely statistical regu-
larities. The ARIMA (AutoRegressive Integrated 
Moving Average) method
6 expresses each variable in 
terms of linear combinations of its own past (Auto-
Regressive) and random "shocks" (Moving Aver-
age).
7 To get the benchmark, an ARIMA structure is 
estimated using data up to the control period. Then, 
assuming that the shocks are zero, the structure is 
used to generate values for the variable for the con-
trol period and thereafter. 
Studies using these methods to investigate the 
impact of the last controls have produced varied re-
sults. Two studies using the structural method, for 
example, found that inflation was down significantly 
from what it would have been during Phases I and II 
and somewhat after that as well.
8 Another study using 
the same method, though, found that inflation was 
only slightly less than what it would have been during 
controls and slightly more after.
9 A study using the 
ARIMA method didn't look at what happened after 
controls, but it found still a third result for Phases I 
and II: depending on the price measure used, con-




Who's right? That's pretty hard to say, particu-
larly because both of the methods these studies used 
are defective. 
The structural method may be the weakest. It 
requires researchers to describe economic behavior 
with equations, and that is not easy.
1
1
 Although each 
of the structural studies referred to above, for exam-
ple, presumes to identify the same "structure," their 
authors disagree considerably on the precise form of 
the equations and the appropriate price index. But 
even if economists could agree on a structure, this 
method has a more critical problem: although most 
economic indicators would likely be affected by wage 
and price controls, this method assumes some "exog-
enous variables" would not, and it relies on them to 
3For a critique and summary of this type of study before 1973, see 
Walter Y. Oi, "On Measuring the Impact of Wage and Price Controls: 
A Critical Appraisal," The Economics of Price and Wage Controls, 
Vol. 2 of Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, ed. 
Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer (Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub-
lishing Co., 1976), pp. 7-64. Three studies which used this approach are 
Timothy W. McGuire, "On Estimating the Effects of Controls," The 
Economics of Price and Wage Controls, pp. 115-156; Robert J. Gordon, 
"The Response of Wages and Prices to the First Two Years of Con-
trols," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity-3 (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1973), pp. 765-779; and James L. Pierce and 
Jared J. Enzler, "The Effects of External Inflationary Shocks," Brook-
ings Papers on Economic Activity-1 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1974), pp. 13-61. 
4The Phillips curve is a graph of the observed inverse relationship 
between the inflation rate and the unemployment rate. 
An example of the type of equations in structural systems is McGuire's 
"price equation": 
p(t) = b„ + b,| l/u(t)| + b2|l/u(t-l)| + Pftt-1) + v(t) 
where p(t) is the percentage change in prices at time t, u(t) is the unemploy-
ment rate at time t, Pf(t— 1) is the (unobserved) expected percentage change 
in prices at time t, v(t) is a random term, and b0, b,, and b2 are coefficients to 
be estimated. 
6We know of only one study to date which has used this method: 
Edgar L. Feige and Douglas K. Pearce, "The Wage-Price Control Ex-
periment-Did It Work?" Challenge, Vol. 16, No. 3 (July/August 1973), 
pp. 40-44. An extended version of this paper, "Inflation and Incomes 
Policy: An Application of Time Series Models," appears in The Eco-
nomics of Price and Wage Controls, pp. 273-302. 
An example of this is the Feige-Pearce consumer price index inflation 
equation: 
p(t) = p(t-l) + p(jt-4) - p(t-5) + e(t) - 0.57e(t~ 1) -
0.77 e(t—4) + 0.44e(t-5) 
where p(t) is the rate of inflation at time t and e(t) is a random "noise" at 
time t. 
"Gordon and Pierce-Enzler. 
9McGuire. 
10Feige-Pearce. 
"Economists have become suspicious of the types of restrictions 
inherent in this procedure. See, for instance, C. A. Sims, "Macro-
economics and Reality," Econometrica (forthcoming). 
3 generate what other variables would have been with-
out controls. Two of the three structural studies 
referred to above, for instance, assume that the un-
employment terms in their inflation equations were 
unaffected by controls, and the other makes a similar 
assumption. But economic theory and careful empiri-
cal work suggest that policies such as wage and price 
controls do change the behavior of agents in the labor 




neity assumptions, then, make the results of these 
studies suspect. 
The ARIMA method overcomes the exogeneity 
problem since benchmarks generated by it depend 
only on the past history of the variable being fore-
casted, not on any other variables. Still, because of 
this, the ARIMA method has its own serious prob-
lem: it omits important variables. For instance, al-
though one would almost surely expect the level of 
the money supply to help forecast the price level, the 
ARIMA method uses only past values of the price 
index. Omitting variables can be very costly. In the 
ARIMA study referred to above, for example, the 
estimates of the CPI inflation rate for the sixteen 
months before controls miss the actual values by an 
average of about 70 percent per month.
1
3 
Our New Method and Results 
To investigate the impact of wage and price controls, 





shares some features of the structural and ARIMA 
methods but overcomes their biggest problems. 
Like the ARIMA method, VAR tries to capture 
statistical, not behavioral regularities in data. It ex-
presses variables in terms of past values of themselves 
too, but it does better than that: it expresses each 
variable in a list of variables (the "Vector" of "VAR") 
in terms of not only its own past but also the past of 
the others in the list (AutoRegression). Thus, impor-
tant variables need not be omitted, as they are in the 
ARIMA method. This can really make a difference in 
results. Whereas the estimates by the ARIMA study 
mentioned earlier miss the actual inflation rates for 




 our VAR estimates miss them by 
less than 2 percent. 
Like the structural method, VAR does rely on 
economic theory, but only to choose the variables to 
include in the system. It solves the structural exog-
eneity problem by generating forecasts for each of 
the variables in the list; no variable is assumed un-
affected by controls. Once the system is estimated up 
to the control period, the benchmark values for the 
next month—August 1971 —are produced by fore-
casting all the variables using data up to that time. 
August's forecasted values are then used to generate 
September's benchmark, September's to generate 
October's benchmark, and so on.
1
6
 Each VAR bench-
mark, therefore, is exactly what a benchmark should 
be: a sequence of predicted values completely un-
affected by events during controls. 
Our study improves on past studies in another 
way. Past studies have reported the impact of con-
trols as the difference between benchmark and actual 
values. But benchmarks cannot be that precise; any 
forecast has some uncertainty around it. We explic-
itly take this into account by calculating and display-




region represents the set of values the variable most 
likely would have had without controls, based on the 
random variation inherent in any economic variable. 
If the actual values of any variable fall outside its 
benchmark region, we can be relatively sure it's be-
12John Geweke, "Wage and Price Dynamics in U.S. Manufactur-
ing," New Methods in Business Cycle Research: Proceedings from a 
Conference (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1977), 
pp. 111-156. 
l3Feige-Pearce, Table 3a, p. 285. The ARIMA was estimated using 
data from 1953.7 to 1970.4. Feige and Pearce do note that this is less 
than one standard error. Our experimentation with ARIMA specifica-
tions got two results. First, for a revised CPI (1967= 100), there exists a 
model specification (numbers of autoregressive and moving average 
parameters) which fits the data better than that used by Feige-Pearce. 
Second, when the Feige-Pearce specification is fit to the revised CPI, 
the estimated parameters are not qualitatively different, and the bench-
mark rate of inflation becomes negative eighteen months after the 
imposition of Phase I and decreases without bound. This result is not 
inconsistent with the values generated and reported by Feige-Pearce 
for the sixteen-month period beginning in August 1971. 
l4An example of a VAR is 
Z(t) = A,Z(t—1) + A2Z(t-2) + . . . + AkZ(t-k) + e(t) 
where Z(t) is a vector of variables at time t, e(t) is a vector of random terms at 
time t, and A, A^ are matrices of coefficients. 
15Feige-Pearce. 
l6This procedure is an application of the chain rule of forecasting. 
17Because the benchmark region for the real wage (wages deflated 
by the price level) involves the distribution of a very complicated 
random variable, it is not presented. 
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1
8 
We chose variables for our VAR vector based on 
a theory of the interaction of the markets for labor 
and aggregate output. In the labor market, supply 
and demand determine the real wage (the money 
wage divided by the price level) and employment. 
These in turn determine aggregate output, and aggre-
gate demand then determines the absolute price level 
and the money wage.
1
9




the consumer price index for all items (CPI, 1967=100) 
the consumer price index for all items except food (1967= 100) 
the wholesale price index (WPI, 1967=100) 
Figures 1-3 show our results for the price mea-
sures, and they're all alike. Generally, controls 
curbed inflation temporarily: during Phases I and II, 
these variables: 
the industrial production index 
(1967=100) 
weekly hours worked in 
manufacturing industries 
as measures of: 
output 
employment 
straight-time average hourly earnings the money wage 
in manufacturing industries 
Ml —the money supply 
(currency + demand deposits) 
aggregate demand 
We used these in VAR systems for three measures of 
"The benchmark regions displayed in the figures are two standard error 
bounds for the forecasts under the assumption that the estimation procedure 
determined the "true" matrices A A^ of note 14. 
19This is an equilibrium or classical explanation of the interaction of 
these two markets. The disequilibrium or Keynesian interpretation 
would not change the list of variables used in the VAR. 
20The VAR which generated the results below was chosen for its 
ability to predict the period 1971.1-1971.6. It had nine lags (the "k" of 
note 14) and was estimated over the period 1964.1-1971.7. The system 
had no statistical priors on the rapidity with which the lag coefficients 
died out. The estimation used the VAR computer program, PREDICT, 
developed by Robert Litterman, Research Assistant, Research Depart-
ment, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 
Figure 1 
Consumer Price Index 
All Items, 1967 = 100 
Phase 
Source of basic data: U.S. Department of Labor 
Figure 2 
Consumer Price Index 
All Items Except Food, 1967 = 100 
Phase 
Figure 3 
Wholesale Price Index 
All Items, 1967 = 100 
Phase 
5 controls held prices somewhat below the benchmark 
region, that is, below what they would have been 
without controls. After Phase II, though, prices rose 
faster than the benchmark region and ended up far 
above it—higher than they would have been without 
controls. 
A look at price inflation rates verifies the tempo-
rary impact of controls. Figure 4 shows the differ-
ences between the actual rate of increase in the CPI 
and what our VAR says it would have been without 
controls. Again we can see that during Phases I and 
II, the inflation rate was lower than it would have 
been. But this clearly did not last long. After Phase II, 
inflation shot up to a rate much higher than it would 
have been otherwise. 
Controls apparently had little or no effect on 
wage inflation, though. As Figure 5 shows, wages 
were held slightly below what they would have been 
during the few months of Phase I. Through Phase II 
and for nearly two years thereafter, however, actual 
and benchmark values for average hourly earnings 
essentially coincide. 
Despite the fact that their wages weren't affected 
much, workers were first made better off, then worse 
off by what controls did to prices. This is evident in 
Figure 6, which compares the actual and benchmark 
values of the real wage (again, wages deflated by the 
price level). During Phases I and II, with prices but 
not wages held down, the real wage rose—eventually 
to a level higher than it otherwise would have. After 
Phase II, prices rose much faster than expected, but 
wages didn't: the real wage dropped sharply and 
ended up lower than it would have been without 
controls. 
Macroeconomic theory suggests that firms will 
respond to increases (decreases) in the real wage, 
other things held constant, by decreasing (increasing) 
employment and hence output. That is exactly what 
the VAR detected for the control period. As can be 
seen in Figures 7 and 8, during Phase I, when the real 
wage increased, the hours worked in manufacturing 
industries dropped and industrial production fell 
Figure 4 
The Impact of Controls on Inflation 
Actual CPI Inflation Rate -








Sources of basic data: U.S. Department of Labor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
Figure 5 
Average Hourly Earnings 
in Manufacturing Industries 
1970 1972 1974 
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The Real Wage 
Average Hourly Earnings in Manufacturing Industries -
Consumer Price Index 
below its benchmark. After controls were lifted, when 
prices exploded and the real wage plummetted, both 
employment and output more than recovered. In the 
long run they both settled back to where they would 
have been without controls. 
Monetary policy seemed to be reacting as usual 
to the changes in output and prices. As Figure 9 
shows, when output and inflation were depressed 
early in the control period, the money supply was not 
expanded more rapidly than would have been ex-
pected; if anything, it increased less rapidly. Then, 
when output and inflation started their catch-up late 
in Phase II, the actual Ml values started to rise faster 
than the benchmark region. 
Summary, Hedges, and Conclusion 
In summary, then, our last wage and price controls 
didn't give us much relief from inflation, and they did 
affect production. Prices were below what they 
would have been during Phases I and II, but except 
for a brief initial period, wages were not. Thus, the 
Figure 7 
Weekly Hours 
in Manufacturing Industries 
Figure 8 




M1 = Currency + Demand Deposits 
1970 1972 1974 
1970 1972 1974 
7 real wage increased more than it would have, and 
employment and output dropped. As Phase II ended, 
though, prices began to catch up. Because controls 
had little effect on wages, this catch-up lowered the 
real wage, and firms responded by hiring more 
workers and boosting production. Evidently, con-
trols caused no long-run output distortions, since 
industrial production eventually returned to where it 
would have been without controls. Probably because 
of an accommodating monetary policy, however, 
prices ended up higher than they would have. 
As with any empirical investigation of economic 
phenomena, our results should be interpreted care-
fully. All the differences between actual values and 
benchmark regions may not be due to the controls 
program; there may have been shocks to the price 
level we could not have accounted for. Also, because 
we considered only measured, published prices, we 
had to ignore true transaction prices—prices which 
during the control program would have reflected 
increased waiting times due to product shortages, at-
tempts at evasion through disguised price increases, 
and the resources used up by government in enforce-
ment programs designed to punish such evasion. 
Still, the new method we used makes this study of 
the impact of the last wage and price controls a 
considerable improvement over past studies. So 
policy makers should take note: wage and price con-
trols are not likely to provide lasting relief from 
inflation. 
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